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Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice and the Army in the 21st Century

A Monograph

by

MAJ James E. Rexford

United States Army



**School of Advanced Military Studies
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14. ABSTRACT This study investigates the Army's current view of theory, conflict and conflict resolution as found in its doctrine and supporting publications. Using Paul Reynolds' <i>A Primer in Theory Construction</i> , this study conducts a comparison between the literature from the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict and Conflict Resolution with Army doctrine and publications. Each of the three topics is examined from the two different fields to determine which one has the more thorough and developed understanding of these concepts. In the case of theory and conflict, Army doctrine is very deficient compared to the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict and Conflict Resolution. In the area of conflict resolution, the Army has made notable improvements in its doctrinal content on the subject. However, because of the deficiencies in the first two areas, doctrine has a narrow heuristic content and a deficient conceptual concept of conflict resolution as compared to the other fields. The study recommends changes to doctrine concerning the concepts of theory and conflict and the addition of a manual for conflict resolution.					
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Abstract

CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE AND THE ARMY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, by MAJ James E. Rexford, USA, 72 pages.

The Army faces both significant external and some internal changes. These external changes in its operational environment, precipitated by the end of the Cold War, have created new threats and conflicts for the Army to contend with. This monograph proposes that the Army must reevaluate its understanding of the role of theory, the definition of conflict, and the practices of conflict resolution to effectively deal with these changes. The method of research used was comparing and contrasting the theories, definitions, and practices as found in the literature of the fields of Theory, Peace Studies, and Conflict Resolution with those found in Army publications.

This comparison of literature developed a clear understanding of what a theory is, how it is developed, and its role in the development of a body of knowledge. The research applied this foundational understanding of theory to the body of knowledge concerning conflict and conflict resolution. This concept of what conflict is as defined by the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution was compared to what is found in Army publications. The same was done concerning the concept, theories, and practices of conflict resolution.

The research concluded that the Army's concepts of theory, conflict, and conflict resolution are deficient, especially when compared to those found in the fields of Theory, Peace Studies, and Conflict Resolution. From this conclusion, three recommendations were made for the Army: (1) incorporate a fuller explanation of theory in Army capstone manuals and a greater use of current theorists throughout Army manuals, (2) expand the definition of conflict within Army manuals, (3) develop a separate Army manual for conflict resolution.

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INTRODUCTION

The Army needs to expand and encourage the study and teaching of theory and theoretical concepts to support a better understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. The Nation and current events compelled the Army to shift from the Cold War model focused on high intensity conflict to a post Cold War model of full-spectrum conflict. This shift expanded the Army's threat from primarily a peer competitor to engaging an asymmetric enemy that shared little similarity in organization, world view, or methodology. An examination of the majority of current doctrine reveals how the Army continues to filter its view of all conflict through the lens of high-intensity conflict. When conflict is addressed, most doctrine deals primarily with armed conflict and firmly places conflict as an external issue to the Army. This view of conflict runs counter to the views of most theorists and practitioners in the field of conflict and conflict resolution.

Historically there are three causes for organizations to undergo significant change or innovation: when expanding the organization's influence, when the organization fails, and when pressured by external forces.¹ The first two are primarily products of the decisions made or not made by the organization, while the last is usually comprised of forces beyond the control of the organization. The Army's history has many examples of external pressures compelling it to change. The Army at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries was compelled to change from a predominantly frontier force to one with global reach because of the nation's drive to become a global power. This same period saw technological advances and the geopolitical changes of World War I exert tactical and doctrinal pressures on the Army. The catastrophic failures of World War I generated significant changes, both tactically and strategically, for all combatants, but especially for the European militaries. Today, doctrine captures many of these external forces in the concept of operational environment.

¹Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 42.

The method used for the research of this monograph is comparing and contrasting the literature from the field of conflict resolution and peace studies to Army doctrine and publications in order to show differences and deficiencies concerning the understanding of the concepts of conflict and conflict resolution. The research also considered the importance theory plays in these concepts and how a lack of use and understanding of theory and its analytical method contributes to the Army's deficiencies in conflict and conflict resolution. The research focused on Army doctrine because it is the source document for all Army curricula² and the fundamental guide for all actions in support of national objectives.³ Chapter One examined the current operational environment (COE) to show how it generates conflict and the need for conflict resolution. The chapter considered external forces that challenge the Army today. Several events shaped the COE, the most significant of which was the demise of the Soviet Union. Additionally, major actors on the world scene who affect the military's ability to perform its duties are listed and characterized. These include both hostile and friendly organizations. A brief discussion of a significant internal challenge the military faces is provided. These changes need to be accounted for and the Army must consider adapting to stay relevant in the current operational environment.

Theory and its development are foundational to understanding conflict and conflict resolution. Therefore, Chapter Two examined and explained some of the key principles and characteristics of theory and theory development as found in Paul Reynolds' *A Primer in Theory Construction*. Also presented are the opinions of some conflict resolution theorists and practitioners and Army literature concerning the relationships between theory and policy (doctrine), policy and practice, and theory and practice. This chapter concluded by describing the similarities and differences between the academic and the military views of these theoretical relationships, having laid a foundational understanding of theory and its relationship to doctrine, practice and scientific knowledge.

²Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-14.

³Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-65.

Chapter Three provided an examination of conflict based on the study of theory presented in the previous chapter. Specific definitions for several key terms such as “war,” “peace,” “dispute,” and “competition” are provided. Some of the root causes of conflict, as found in the field of conflict resolution, are discussed. It described how this concept is a key element to both fields and directly impacts the perspective and methods a practitioner from either the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution or the Army would take. After comparing the two points of view and considering where there is a shortfall in defining these key terms and concepts, the chapter concluded by examining the relevance of conflict, as defined, to the Army.

Having defined the central concept, the research presented possible solutions to managing, settling, or resolving conflict. Chapter Four examined characteristics of some of the current conflict resolution methods. It focused on the technique of analytical problem-solving approach that deals with violent conflict as being the most difficult to resolve and germane to Army operations. It examined how the Army pursues conflict resolution and some of its current methodologies as outlined in the manuals. Finally, the chapter examined the similarities and differences between how the field of Conflict Resolution and the Army understand and practice conflict resolution. Also discussed is how these differences in understanding and methodology impact the Army.

The conclusion brought all of these elements together to offer a better understanding of how the literature in the field of Conflict Resolution and the Army present very different views of theory which in turn affects the understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. It showed that the Army’s approach to developing its doctrine significantly differs from how policy and practice is developed in the field of conflict resolution. Addressed in this chapter is the Army’s narrow view of conflict due to its lack of theoretical underpinning. This narrow view of conflict and lack of theoretical background also diminishes the Army’s developing understanding of conflict resolution. These impact its ability to stay agile and relevant in the current operational environment. The conclusion presented how the Army can gain a more complete and useful

picture of the phenomenon it is called to deter, manage, resolve and settle by employing a theoretical approach to understanding the full spectrum of conflict and conflict resolution. It presented possibilities for expanding these views, with corresponding recommendations for changes to doctrine and practice.

CHAPTER ONE

CASE FOR CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Over the past twenty years, the world has experienced significant changes across the entire spectrum of human endeavor. Dramatic upheavals and shifts in political, economic, scientific, environmental, technological, and informational areas have created a new and very different world. Many organizations are facing significant challenges in most of these areas because the rate of change is occurring so rapidly--shifts in a few years, or months, versus a few generations. These challenges include the need to identify emerging trends and predict their outcomes and effect on the organizational operational environments. Once a trend is identified, the organization must then adapt to remain relevant. The United States Army is one such organization.

Understanding the current operational environment (COE) is essential to mission success. The COE is an area the Army has very little control over, but needs to understand. The COE encompasses and defines the reasons the Army exists and contains factors that identify and most influence the Army's mission. Understanding it is essential to making the best decisions for how the Army should change to maintain current dominance in land combat operations and ensure success in the remaining elements of full spectrum operations. According to Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0), *Operations* the operational environment has six dimensions: (1) threat, (2) political, (3) unified action, (4) land combat operations, (5) information and (6) technology.⁴ This chapter examined the dimensions of threat, political, and unified action to consider how changes within each affected the Army's need to expand its understanding of conflict and conflict resolution.

⁴Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1-8.

Case for Conflict--Political and Threat Dimensions

From the end of World War II to the end of the 1990s, most of the world was divided into two world views. The United States led one and the Soviet Union led the other. Most countries allied themselves with one superpower or the other for ideological, geographical, or economic reasons. These alliances provided money, security, and help with internal problems. During this time the United States and Soviet Union spent a considerable amount of money in the form of direct finance funds.⁵ These funds helped allies or proxy countries pay for their defense, both external and internal. These conditions and funds allowed countries, aligned with either the United States or the Soviet Union, to repress or put down dissident groups (usually, or at least labeled, ideologically opposite of their patron power) within their borders. With the end of the Cold War, these relationships and the system they created began to change.

The first and most dramatic harbinger of global changes was the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. This event precipitated the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the dismantling--both physically and psychologically--of the iron curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were the catalyst for many dramatic changes. These global changes directly affected the Army's operational environment. The Army no longer had a single, overriding threat to study and prepare to defeat. The political environment that controlled and dictated the Army's mission and organization no longer consisted of two monolithic political, military, and economic power blocks. The current operational environment is much more dynamic in terms of alliances, money flow, and internal security. There is a new era in which regional powers combine to form alliances based on regional interests. This began in the 1970s with Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and continues to change the current operational environment. Some examples are the European Union (EU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and African Union (AU). The political environment has realigned and coalesced around regional

⁵Thomas P. M. Barnett, *Pentagon's New Map and Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating*--Guest Speaker Program 9 December 2005, (CDROM) 88 minutes, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2005.

powers and issues. The result is a multipolar world where threats and alliances are more fluid, and there is no longer a singular, clear cut threat to compel an alliance with the United States.

The fall of the Soviet Union caused the threat picture or perceived threat to dramatically change. The United States and its allies no longer face a peer competitor: a military that looks like us, is armed like us, and fights like us. Near peer rivals, those countries with the potential to equal the United States militarily and possess similar military structures do still exist. However, these nations are not the primary opponent in much of the conflict the United States faces today. In some cases, it is not conventional forces that pose the most direct threat to the United States and its interests.⁶ The threats the United States faces are nations and organizations that cannot compete with the United States economically or militarily. These new enemies do not see the world in a similar way. Their doctrine, culture and worldview are completely different from our own. These nations actively support militant non-state organizations for the purpose of challenging and countering the United States' strengths. In addition to these nations, the United States faces the militant non-state organizations themselves (for example, terrorists, insurgents, and criminals). Unlike nations who gain their ability to buy, field, train, and maintain military capability from a national will, economy and population, the strength of these rogue groups comes from popular support across a region. For example, Al Qaeda receives funds from interest groups within Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, and throughout the Muslim world. Because these organizations do not have the benefit of garnering funds from a national tax base or industry, they operate on a much smaller scale than a nation such as the United States. As a result, they resort to terrorist acts to gain the most political impact and do as much damage as possible with the least amount of resources.

The conventional capability of the Soviet Union during the late Cold War was the military threat aspect most important to the Army and its political masters. From a military and

⁶Thomas P. M. Barnett, *After Words with Thomas P.M. Barnett Interviewed by Representative Tom Freeney (R)*; Available from <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm>; Internet; accessed on 17 May 2007.

political point of view, these forces posed a significant risk to the United States and its interests, especially in Western Europe and the Middle East. The Army spent the 1970s and 1980s devising doctrine and capabilities that could best defeat this threat. As Robert Spiller explains, the Army developed the fundamental premise that the United States could defeat the Soviets in Western Europe through intensive training and the purchase of superior military hardware.⁷ Along with developing our own capabilities to overmatch the enemy's, the Army sought to undermine the enemy's capabilities. In a peer military this was routine. The Army could examine its own assets and identify the weakness and mirror them to the enemy. Then, through intelligence gathering and careful study of the enemy, the Army could identify specific reconnaissance and logistics units to destroy in order to deny the enemy the ability to see the battlespace and feed its forces. These focused attacks weakened the enemy's main combat forces, thus giving the initiative, advantage, and victory to the United States.

The enemy the United States faces both now and in the foreseeable future is difficult to define. Terrorists, insurgents and criminal organizations operate with a completely different force structure. These organizations rely on the local populations for their reconnaissance and logistics. Denying the enemy its eyes, ears, beans and bullets is no longer as simple as identifying a particular type of unit and then destroying or neutralizing it because of the risk of collateral damage and political fallout from civilian casualties. Instead, the military must devise a new way to neutralize or destroy the enemy's support system. One possibility of doing this is to win the locals away from the enemy. The Army understands that the battle is no longer only fought with bullets. This understanding is reflected in Field Manual 3-07 (FM 3-07), *Stability and Support Operations*; Field Manual 3-07.31 (FM 3-07.31), *Peace Operations*; and Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), *Counterinsurgency*. However, in addition to matters like security, basic services, and economic opportunity, the Army needs to consider that a source of conflict could be the

⁷Roger J. Spiller, "In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army After Vietnam," *RUSI Journal* (December 1997): 52-53.

dissonance between the values and beliefs of the two groups. Discerning the values that motivate the locals to side with the enemy is potentially a more powerful weapon. This is where a clear understanding of conflict and a practical use of conflict resolution would enhance the likelihood of mission success.

Case for Conflict--Unified Action Dimension

In this operational environment, other participants are becoming more prevalent in global troubled spots. Two important participants are coalition forces and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Increasingly the United States is embarking on missions that require coalition, allied or other national military players especially under the auspices of the United Nations. Although the Army has a long tradition of working with allies in military operations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the missions have changed to reflect a new operational environment. During the Cold War, nations were willing to suborn national and domestic goals for the sake of military necessity in order to protect their nation from credible threats. In today's post Cold War world, nations are no longer as willing to do this. Operations are seen as a matter of political will to address a natural disaster, provide humanitarian relief, conduct peace keeping, or, more rarely, execute peace enforcement. These situations no longer directly threaten national safety and do not warrant the loss of domestic support to pursue. Nations now retain closer control of their military forces by placing stipulations on their use. This means the operational relationship is more cooperation and coordination than command and control. This, coupled with often diverse political goals amongst coalition members, creates an environment where conflicts arise and need to be resolved to ensure military success.

The second group growing in prevalence is non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They are playing a much more vital role in many of the trouble spots where the United States deals with conflict or catastrophe today (for example, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, and Darfur). NGOs are already present and will continue their presence long after the United States

forces leave. This presence has been steadily expanding with the end of the Cold War. It is the combination of increasing internal strife, humanitarian disasters, and the steady decline in development dollars from western governments that has resulted in a greater reliance upon NGOs to provide relief and development assistance. This trend shows no sign of abatement.⁸ As their presence grows in the operational environment, it is essential that the coordination between the military and the NGOs become more efficient if the intent is for long term and lasting solutions for the local population. In today's complex environment it is obvious that "only a well-planned and coordinated combination of civilian and military measures can create the conditions for long-term stability and peace in divided societies."⁹ This relationship between the military and NGOs is problematic because of conflicting culture, competing goals, and compromising the neutrality of NGOs. Culturally, the military is more comfortable with tightly coordinated, command relationships, whereas NGOs tend to operate independently and cooperatively.¹⁰ The goals of the two groups can become a point of conflict. Military forces, especially the United States military, have politically motivated and directed goals. Many NGOs find it untenable to work with military forces, in particular the United States, because these goals often run counter to theirs of simply providing humanitarian relief.¹¹ Ultimately, many NGOs refuse to work with the military because it can compromise their neutrality. Often a NGO risks losing its neutrality with local factions by simply being in the same compound or convoy with United Nation or foreign military forces. This loss of neutrality compromises their ability to provide aid and threatens their security.¹² The Army must learn to cooperate with these groups and accommodate them in these areas when

⁸Francis Kofi Abiew, "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, ed. Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 25.

⁹Abiew, 25.

¹⁰Joelle Jenny, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: Finding Ways to Make it Work," *European Security*, Vol. X, No. 2, Summer 2001, p. 27, quoted in Francis Kofi Abiew, "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, ed. Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 30.

¹¹Daniel Byman, "Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military," *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 2, Summer 2001, p. 99, quoted in Francis Kofi Abiew, "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, ed. Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 32.

¹²Romeo Dailaire, "The Changing Role of UN Peacekeeping Forces: The Relationship Between UN Peacekeepers and NGOs in Rwanda" in Jim Whitman and David Pocock (eds.) *After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance*, (London: Macmillian, 1996), p. 207, quoted in Francis Kofi Abiew, "NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations," In *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, ed. Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 31.

possible. Understanding the characteristics of conflict and knowing how to manage or resolve it allows both organizations to more effectively work together to establish lasting stability and benefit the local population.

Case for Conflict--Internal Considerations and Conclusion

The Army faces significant changes in its external environment that are generating new threats and requiring new methods to counter these threats. The Army also faces changes from within that are creating additional, internal challenges. Leonard Wong of the Strategic Studies Institute wrote concerning a junior officer retention survey conducted in the late 1990s. Wong discusses three major reasons that junior officers are leaving: the officers believe the senior leadership “just don’t get it,” senior leadership does not understand how the junior officers think, and the junior officers hold very different values.¹³ These perceptions and opposing values create conflict. This creates ideal conditions for developing conflict resolution skills. Developing these skills will reduce internal conflict and enhance the ability to use these skills when they are applied to the external situations.

The end of the Cold War created new political and economic realities. These new realities have reshaped how nations ally and cooperate. Countries now find it more important to decide how they are going to interact with particular nations rather than follow a large alliance such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact. These changes have also generated a new threat in the form of militant non-governmental organizations and the nations that support them. The nature of their asymmetric military capabilities and their reliance on local populations have dramatically changed the methods needed to evaluate, counter and defeat them. Additionally, the new political environment has seen a significant rise in the number of NGOs and their presence in troubled spots around the world. Each of these factors, from the individual to the international, have the

¹³Leonard Wong, “Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2000), 3-7

potential for creating conflict and the opportunity to practice conflict resolution as one of many skills needed to succeed in today's complex operational environment.

CHAPTER 2

THEORY AND ITS ROLE

The comparison of theories and practices as set out in the current field of conflict resolution with those relating to the issue of war, conflict, and peace within Army literature is provided. This lays the ground work for this comparison and examination, this chapter considered what theory is and how knowledge (or history), theory, doctrine (or policy) and practices relate. This is information the Army should consider to effectively and fully develop its understanding of conflict and conflict resolution and how this translates into functional application.

The primary purpose of this research is to present just some of the basic concepts not an in-depth examination of how social science theory is developed. First, it examined the general idea of a theory as it relates to a body of scientific knowledge through Paul Reynolds' *A Primer in Theory Construction*. Next, it considered how theory relates specifically to the field of Conflict Resolution by considering some of the explanations and observations by theorists and practitioners of conflict resolution. Next considered are the views of those authors whose arguments make up the bulk of the monograph in the following chapters. Finally, the chapter also included relevant writings from Army documents and military scientists that bear on how the Army views the relationship between knowledge, theory, and practice. From this emerged a picture of the integral and vital part that theory plays, or should play, in the effective development of knowledge, policy or doctrine, and practice.

Theory--Dr. Paul Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction*

Dr. Paul Reynolds, a professor of sociology, wrote *A Primer in Theory Construction* to describe a system of scientific knowledge. In it he first described what a body of scientific knowledge is, its purpose, and characteristics. Second, he described and defined the building blocks of scientific knowledge--ideas, concepts and statements, while showing how statements transition into theories. Third, he addressed the forms and testing of theories. Finally, he

recommended strategies for developing a scientific body and concluded with a summary of his assumptions and the potential of this system for Social Science.

Foundational to this theoretical approach is to understand what a body of scientific knowledge is and its purpose. Scientific knowledge is a “system for description and explanation.” A system that is limited to answering the question “why things *happen*” as opposed to “why things *exist*,”[emphasis added]. The latter belongs more to the disciplines of theology and philosophy. To be useful scientific knowledge should provide: “(1) a method of organizing and categorizing “things,” a *typology*; (2) *Predictions* of future events; (3) *Explanations* of past events; (4) *A sense of understanding* about what causes events; ... (5) The potential for *control* of events.”¹⁴ As one closely examines these components of scientific knowledge, it becomes clear how a fundamental “concept of understanding” is essential to scientific knowledge. The development of typology promotes the systematic and standardized organizing and categorizing of the basic characteristics of an object (a noble gas) or a field of human endeavor (conflict resolution). This organizes in a useful way the physical, structural, or cognitive characteristics, which results in an understanding of the basic components or concepts.¹⁵ The next components are prediction and explanation. These two, “except for a difference in temporal position,” demonstrate an understanding of how the components fit together and relate, allowing the observer to either explain past occurrences of an interaction of the studied components or predict future occurrences and express them in a concise and clear statement. This statement of understanding can also be used to organize and classify the information within the studied area, leading to a sense of understanding.¹⁶ Sense of understanding, the most challenging component, is when an observer can demonstrate the ability to fully describe the causal mechanisms that link changes in one or more concepts with changes in other concepts.¹⁷ The description of these causal

¹⁴Paul Davidson Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 3-4.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 4-5.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 5-7.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 7-9.

processes to develop causal statements is “the most important purpose of scientific activity.” Through these processes, when properly formulated, explanations and predictions are provided, organization and classifications are developed, and the confidence to control events emerges.¹⁸ The scientific effort culminates when the observer attains this sense of understanding.

Along with the sense of understanding gained by building the causal statement, Reynolds stressed the concepts of usefulness and confidence. Usefulness is a key factor in determining the value of concepts and statements and whether or not to include them in a scientific body of knowledge. A statement (or theory) is deemed useful when it properly describes the causal relationships between concepts in order to determine what variables the observer can or cannot affect to modify an outcome.¹⁹ A connection is drawn between “usefulness” and “confidence” by addressing the empirical relevance of a scientific statement. Empirical relevance describes the “possibility of comparing some aspect of a scientific statement, a prediction or explanation, with objective empirical research.”²⁰ It is empirical relevance that differentiates between just perceiving an event and being able to explain it. When a statement has empirical relevance, in an easily understandable format, other scientists can then test this statement and determine for themselves the usefulness of the statement. This ability to successfully repeat the findings of a useful statement builds the confidence in the validity of the statement and its probability of being included in the scientific body of knowledge. Through this increase of individual confidence the corporate body of scientists gains confidence and the level of the statement’s acceptance as a valid part of the scientific body of knowledge increases.

The concept of confidence is used to differentiate between different types of theoretical statements, such as laws, axioms, propositions, and hypotheses. A law is a statement that has the overwhelming confidence of the majority of scientists that it is considered to be “absolutely true.” Axioms are basic statements that are accepted as true, yet do not usually enjoy the level of

¹⁸Ibid., 9.

¹⁹Ibid., 10.

²⁰Ibid., 17-18.

confidence of a law. Axioms are combined together to create propositions, which are then tested like a hypothesis. A proposition or, to a greater extent, a hypothesis is a theoretical statement that has yet to be tested and has little to no confidence at the individual or corporate level.²¹ These theoretical statements (laws, axioms, propositions, and hypotheses) make up scientific knowledge. A theory is the conception (or form) of organizing sets of these statements. There are three types of conceptions, each with its own advantages and disadvantages: “(1) set-of-laws, (2) axiomatic, and (3) causal process.” (See Appendix A for examples of all three forms.)²²

The first two statement types (set-of-law and axiomatic) are not easily applicable to Social Science. The set-of-laws type requires that only laws be included in the body of scientific knowledge. This results in a very high level of confidence, but provides no “sense of understanding”, especially in the realm of social science where most concepts do not lend themselves to concrete empirical testing. Second, the limitation on requiring the identification of concepts in a concrete setting (allowing empirical testing) disallows any unmeasurable concepts or hypothesis--such as dispositional concepts, “which refer to the tendency of ‘things’ to create certain affects.” Finally, since each concept and law must be tested independently, without drawing on the empirical support of other laws, this would necessitate a large amount of research and become unnecessarily inefficient.²³ Axiomatic theory consists of an interrelated set of definitions and statements with four important features: (1) A set of definitions; (2) A set of existence statements that describe the situation which the theory can be applied (scope condition); (3) A set of relational statements, divided into two groups: Axioms (statements from which all other theoretical statements are derived) and Propositions (all other statements, derived from a combination of axioms, axioms and propositions, and other propositions).²⁴ Although this format lends itself to causal statements and a correlating sense of understanding, “the lack of social

²¹Ibid., 78.

²²Ibid., 83.

²³Ibid., 89-92.

²⁴Ibid., 92-93.

science theories in axiomatic format form suggests that it has either been impossible or undesirable for social scientists to put their ideas into this format. However, almost all of the paradigms in social science appear amiable to the following form of theory, the causal process form.”²⁵

The causal process form, like the axiomatic form, is an “interrelated set of definitions and statements.” It has only three features, the first two are similar to the axiomatic: (1) Set of definitions; (2) Set of existence statements “that describe those situations in which one or more of the causal process are expected to occur.” The final feature is (3) the causal statements, which describe either deterministic or probabilistic relations. This details causal processes or causal mechanisms that identify the effect independent variable(s) have on dependent variable(s). All causal statements, regardless of impact on dependent variables, are considered equally important to the theory (they are not divided into axioms and propositions). This and how the statements are presented (as a causal process) are the major differences between the axiomatic and causal forms. Normally, when a scientist presents a theory that explains how something happens, he or she will usually describe it using one or more causal processes.²⁶ As with the first two forms, the causal process meets the criteria of scientific knowledge of typology, prediction, explanation, and the potential for control. However, it provides a sense of understanding that is missing from the other two. It allows for hypothetical or unmeasurable concepts, more efficient research, and the examination of all the consequences including any unintentional consequences.²⁷ There is a disadvantage in using the causal process form. The theorist does not know when all steps or statements have been identified in a causal process. Paul Reynolds suggests that there is no objective answer. The best solution would be to draw on the consensus (or confidence) of

²⁵Ibid., 95-97.

²⁶Ibid., 97-98.

²⁷Ibid., 106.

colleagues within the relevant fields to determine when the theory is mature enough to be useful.²⁸

While there are different ways a scientist can test theories, such as the statistical decision procedures or changing confidence, this research focused on considering the matter of comparing theories. Contrary to popular belief, scientists are not focused on finding the “right” theories and disproving the “wrong” ones. Instead, they are concerned with the “development of more accurate descriptions of phenomena.”²⁹ The primary goal of scientific endeavor is not theory comparisons but refining our understanding of how a phenomenon happens. There are many variables which affect how well a theory works. Theoretical statements must be very specific as to how, when and under what circumstances a theory will work. As a result, it is very difficult to compare two theories unless they address the exact same situation. However, on those occasions where theories propose to explain the same event but are incompatible there is usefulness in considering the criteria used to choose between the theories. This comparison is based on the assumption that both theories are equally supported by empirical data, if otherwise, then “the theory that explains more data is the obvious choice.”³⁰ A second criterion for the purpose of comparing theories, assuming similar empirical data, is which theory does a better job of providing a sense of understanding. One can judge which theory has the more effective explanation on an individual basis or as a group, depending on requirements and purposed of the comparison. Thus, for comparing theories, one must look first at the amount of empirical data supporting a theory and then to the efficacy of its explanation of the causal process to determine which is the better theory.

²⁸Ibid., 107.

²⁹Ibid., 120-133.

³⁰Ibid., 134.

Theory--The Fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution

Many members of the field of conflict resolution concur with Reynolds' premise that theory is how an individual, or group, perceives a phenomenon and then explains why it happens. From this premise, theorists and practitioners of conflict resolution derive two additional aspects of theory. First, theories form and shape the understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. Second, to many practitioners theory is an indispensable part of the dynamic process of conflict and conducting conflict resolution.

The first derivative from this general premise on theory is that concepts which conflict participants or observers hold of a particular situation are theories. These mental concepts, paradigms, or personal theories shape and motivate their perceptions and actions.³¹ Therefore, they can become a source of conflict and affect the resolution of the conflict. Just as a scientist uses a theory to interpret and understand the outcome of an experiment, participants in a conflict use their ideologies and beliefs as filters and lenses to interpret the actions of others involved. From these interpretations--explanations of why things happen or don't happen--the participants explain their opponent's motives inside the conflict and the motives of outside observers. They also use them to justify their actions and point to the ideologies of the other side as being the source of a conflict.³² Observers who understand the role of a personal theory, also known as a prejudice or bias, can explain to the participants how information filtered through this personal theory can contribute to a conflict. This enables the participants to test the validity of their personal theories, thus opening the participants to reconsidering their perceptions of the conflict or their opponents. This can lead to conflict resolution. Lois Kriesberg uses the example of the Cold War. The Soviets were ideologically driven to see any action on the part of the United States as a product of the inherent drive of capitalism to seek resources and markets. While the United

³¹Clark, Mary, "Symptoms of Cultural Pathologies," In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 44-45.

³²Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflict* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 30-31.

States interpreted Soviet actions as a product of Marxist-Leninist's inherent expansionist tendencies to support communist movements in other countries.³³ Observers must also be mindful of their own personal theories. How they perceive the participants and their ideologies are personal theories. These affect the way observers interpret information and characteristics in a conflict. For this reason Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, proponents of the analytical-problem solving approach to conflict resolution, recommend the observers put their "theories or values . . . into cold storage" during the initial fact-finding or analytical stage of third party conflict resolution. This enables the observers to focus on identifying the conflict's structure, major parties, issues and potential resolutions. With this in mind, Mitchell and Banks further recommend that academics who are experts in theory development conduct the initial analysis of any conflict rather than experts in the region or peoples involved. By doing this, the initial gathering of evidence is done as neutrally as possible.³⁴ These professionals are also proficient in the methods of writing theory and understand how to identify key elements of a phenomenon (in this case a conflict). They are able to develop concepts and statements to explain why things are happening. This is done in such a manner that knowledge is conveyed with high confidence. This method creates a theory for a specific conflict and allows the observers and participants to redefine the relationships and develop potential solutions to resolve it.

The second derivative of Reynolds' premise on theory is that theory is an indispensable part of the dynamic process of understanding conflict and facilitating conflict resolution. Theorists of conflict resolution, who are often practitioners, see theory as an integral part of the study conflict and the practice of conflict resolution. This view comes from the historical impetus for the founding of the field of conflict resolution and peace studies. The founders' background in academia, their familiarity with the theoretical process, and their desire to see their work have a closer tie to and affect on the real world (or practice) compelled them to establish the field. The

³³Ibid.

³⁴Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The analytical problem-solving approach*, (London: Printer: A Cassell imprint, 1996), 32-33.

failure of early peace, social, and liberal movements to prevent the outbreaks of World War I and World War II and the added urgency of possible nuclear annihilation sparked a renewed effort to establish disciplines of study for conflict, peace, and the prevention of war.³⁵ Centers to study these fields were established on college and university campuses in North America (Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, 1959) and Northern Europe (International Peace Research, University of Oslo, 1960).³⁶ This relationship between theory and practice was a fundamental part of the foundation of these institutes. The Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University College, London, was founded in the mid-1960s out of the belief that current views (theories) of conflict and international relations were inadequate. It was the desire of the founders to promote an improved understanding of conflict (especially the politics of conflict) and to foster contacts between academic observers and political practitioners. This contact was “so that [their] theories could reflect real-world experience,” and “to create stronger ties between theory and practice, so that the ideas of social science could become relevant and usable.”³⁷ John Burton, a career diplomat and noted conflict resolution theorist, proposed that conflict resolution as political theory is used to deduce policy. From policy one moves to application or practice. Through execution and observation one can validate the theory in the successes and generate new hypotheses when problems are encountered.³⁸ Finally, many theorists are, albeit part-time, practitioners. They base and test their theories on practical experience. Because they study and use theory in real situations, these theorists have confidence in the effectiveness of their theories. John Murray notes that this theorist and practitioner role produces theories that are also embraced by those in the field of conflict resolution who are only

³⁵Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 40.

³⁶*Ibid.* 43-44.

³⁷Mitchell and Banks, vii.

³⁸John W. Burton, “Conflict resolution as a political philosophy,” In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 59.

practitioners.³⁹ It is precisely this academic study and subsequent confidence in theory and practice that the Army needs to incorporate in its own doctrine of conflict and conflict resolution.

Theory--The Army

The Army's two capstone field manuals, Field Manual 1 (FM 1), *The Army* and FM 3-0, *Operations* are lacking concerning theory and its relationship to doctrine. *FM 1* only uses the term theory once while describing the function of doctrine. It states, "[d]octrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice."⁴⁰ Within *FM 3-0* the term theory appears once inside a quote by Frederick the Great.⁴¹ Within the referenced works of these manuals, *FM 1* does not cite any theorists or theoretical publications and *FM 3-0* cites only a few in its Source Notes. These few are from the 19th century or earlier, such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Helmuth von Moltke, Hans Delbruck, and Frederick the Great. Though these theorists are revered, their temporal separation from the current operational environment is significant. Where notations appear in FM 3-0, they refer only to direct quotes used in the manuscript. The placement of these quotes has an inferred association to the principles presented, but do not clearly demonstrate a correlation between the concepts presented in the manual and a theoretical underpinning. In contrast, some of the keystone manuals published in the last three years are not only citing more theorists, but also more current theorists. FM 3-24 cites over nine theorists, all from the 20th century, and provides almost three pages of suggested contemporary readings and scholarly articles on the topic of counterinsurgency.⁴² Most citations continue to relate principally to quotes and vignettes with some notable exceptions. David Galula is quoted in support of the Army's

³⁹John S. Murray, "Using Theory in Conflict Resolution Practice," In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 222.

⁴⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1-21.

⁴¹Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 4-2. "The art of war owns certain elements and fixed principles. We must acquire that theory, and lodge it in our heads--otherwise, we will never get very far."

⁴²Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 December 2006), Annotated Bibliography-1 through Annotated Bibliography-4.

principle of dividing labor between its forces, the host nation, and other organizations.⁴³ Mao Tse Tung's theory of protracted war is presented in detail as the principle explanation for a Protracted Popular War.⁴⁴ The inclusion of the theorist with the principle allows the military practitioner to easily understand the correlation between a principle and the theoretical underpinning from which it was derived. Including the work in a bibliography allows the practitioner to follow up with his own research and decide if the correlation is valid. However, as with the capstone manuals, FM 3-24 does not cite the publications that the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess, revise, update, and publish new doctrine.

In *FM 1* and *FM 3-0* principles are most commonly cited as the cognitive sources for doctrine. According to these two manuals, all doctrine is based on the principles laid out in *FM 1*. These principles consist of "primacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, and military subordination to civilian authority ... maintaining the ability to mobilize rapidly to support the Nation's interests, integrating new technology, and quickly adapting to and learning to win in changing environments and circumstances."⁴⁵ In *FM 3-0* principles are again cited as a source for doctrine. Military experience is also cited as a source.⁴⁶ No definition of "principle" is found in these two manuals. A definition is provided in TRADOC Regulation 25-36 (TRADOC Reg 25-36), *The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program (DLP)*. It defines "fundamental principles" as forming the basic guidance for Army actions in support of national objectives. These are the philosophical underpinnings that help Army leaders be adaptive and creative problem-solvers. These principles reflect the Army's historical, current, and future operational knowledge. They form the basis for introducing to the Army new ideas, technologies, and organizational designs. Fundamental principles are descriptive in nature and when combined with tactics, techniques, and

⁴³Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 2-9. "To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become...a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians."

⁴⁴Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1-6 through 1-7.

⁴⁵Department of the Army, FM 1, 1-9.

⁴⁶Department of the Army, FM 3-0, vii.

procedures, are sufficient to guide operations.⁴⁷ This document, with other Joint documents cited by TRADOC Reg 25-36, provides a better understanding of the cognitive sources for doctrine.

TRADOC Reg 25-36 is a key document for understanding how the Army develops doctrine and the concepts that modify doctrine. It defines key terms, gives the purpose of doctrinal publications, prescribes the method of doctrine development to include approval, and cites Joint publications that further prescribe the method for concept development. Two of the key terms defined are “vision” and “concept.” Vision is how senior Army leaders believe future military operations will be conducted, including a comprehensive view of the capabilities required to accomplish this desired end state. This is a theoretical statement of how military operations will happen in the future. Concept is an idea or “an expression of how something might be done.”⁴⁸ A military concept describes methods (ways) for the use of specific military attributes or capabilities (means) to achieve the stated objectives (ends--or vision). This concept only becomes an accepted method (doctrine) after it has been developed which means, it has undergone experimentation, assessment, and refinement. According to TRADOC Reg 25-36, the purpose of doctrinal publications is to meet commander’s needs. A concept will only be used as a basis for force planning and included in doctrine after it has been validated and approved. The concept then becomes accepted in the Army as it gains confidence.⁴⁹

The doctrinal development process consists of: (1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5) publishing, and dissemination; and (6) implementation, evaluation and rescission.⁵⁰ The assessment phase is the only one germane to the topic of this chapter. In the assessment phase, the proponent determines if the principles and concepts contained in the doctrine are still current, useful and relevant. This is determined by comparing current doctrine to future operational capabilities as researched and analyzed through both the

⁴⁷Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 25-36, *The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program (DLP)*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 18.

⁴⁸Department of the Army, TRADOC Reg 25-36, 17.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 21.

Army Capabilities Integration and Development System (CIDS) and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS). The proponent uses the comparison and validation done through CIDS and, more importantly, the thorough examination of lessons learned from within the proponent's area of responsibility to determine a need for doctrinal requirements.⁵¹ Through this process, the designated proponent and their subordinates are charged with managing the documents, the process, and for final approval. TRADOC Reg 25-36 identifies the individuals responsible for validating and approving the different doctrines before they are published and become actionable.⁵²

TRADOC Reg 25-36 references the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS).⁵³ JCIDS is integral to the process of analyzing and determining the usefulness of new concepts for doctrine. This system is a capabilities approach that describes effective solutions to shortfalls between envisioned future military requirements and current force structure and doctrinal capabilities. All capabilities, material and non-material (including cognitive concepts), must relate directly to capabilities.⁵⁴ To consider these concepts they must address a military problem in the future for which current military capabilities are insufficient. These solutions must be logical and undergo assessment through one of several experimentation processes (see Appendix B).⁵⁵

Joint publications cite John F. Schmitt's "A Practical Guide for Developing and Writing Military Concepts." This document describes a concept, categorizes different types, and gives a litmus test for assessing to existing beliefs, principles, and theories. A concept, according to Schmitt, is "the description of a method or scheme for employing specified military capabilities in the achievement of a stated objective or aim." This description can vary in its breadth and level

⁵¹Ibid., 22.

⁵²Ibid., 4-16.

⁵³JCIDS is found in Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02B, *Joint Ops Concept Development Process* and CJCSI 3170.01E, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*.

⁵⁴Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2007), A-3.

⁵⁵Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, *Joint Operations Concept Development Process*, (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2007), B-1.

of specificity, going from the strategic to the individual Soldier or system.⁵⁶ Concepts are, as described in the regulations, the core of all doctrine.⁵⁷

Concepts can be categorized in a hierarchy: (1) institutional, (2) operating, (3) functional, and (4) enabling.⁵⁸ These levels represent a corresponding rank order, institutional being higher than operating, that defines the relationships between the concepts. Concepts in the operating and below must be consistent with those of the institutional. This is reflected in the corresponding manuals.⁵⁹ *FM 1* is an institutional manual and thus all other manuals are subordinate to its principles. Therefore, as concepts are being developed, a shaping factor to how well it will be accepted or how convincing the supporting arguments must be to support it is affected by how well it supports the concepts and principles in those levels above it.

Another factor that bears on the acceptability of a concept and the credibility of its arguments are their relationships to certain beliefs. A key two of these beliefs are Historical Awareness and recognition of the American Approach to War. Schmitt states that a concept writer must ensure the concept is consistent with the classical war theorists Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.⁶⁰ The concept must also take into account the American Approach to War. Schmitt details this approach claiming that it is pragmatic in nature and based on five characteristics. The implication is that a concept that does not fit within the paradigms of Clausewitz, Sun Tsu and the American Approach to War will have a difficult time of acceptance.

In his concluding remarks, Schmitt acknowledges that the process of validation and acceptance should be one of open and honest debate. Concepts will pass through a kind of crucible and if they are worth their mettle, they will come through the process and be accepted. This process of development, validation, and acceptance take time. This is an issue the Army is working to address in light of the rate of change in the current operational environment.

⁵⁶John F. Schmitt, "A Practical Guide for Developing and Writing Military Concepts," (MacLean, VA: Defense Adaptive Red Team, Hicks and Associates, Inc., December 2002), 3.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 6-10.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 13.

Theory--Conclusion

The goal of theory and scientific research is not to find the truth (absolute principles that are right versus wrong) but to develop “more accurate descriptions of phenomena.”⁶¹ Reynolds’s explanation of the development of theory and knowledge provides the starting point for comparing and contrasting the content of Army and conflict resolution publications. He states that the ultimate purpose for a body of knowledge is to provide a typology, to be explanative and predictive, to provide a sense of understanding, and a modicum of control. When comparing theories, Reynolds recommends choosing the theory that accounts for the data most fully. Finally, he explains that a well developed theory will provide a fuller understanding of a phenomenon and impart confidence to others through its methodology.

The academic community of conflict resolution theorists and practitioners meet these criteria well. Their theories are developed through academic models, which they then test through practical application and dialogue with practitioners. Their academic settings, the import they place on theory, and the significant role theoretical practices play in conflict resolution create the deep understanding and respect they have for it.

The Army system for developing and refining new concepts and doctrine is improving. The model put forth in the last four years in Joint and Army regulations and documents encompasses the scientific and rigorous methodologies found in academic settings. However, there are some weaknesses in the system that could hinder the development of concepts (or theories) that promote the accurate descriptions of the phenomena the Army will face now and in the future. The three most significant are the approval method, the unquestioned authority that classical theory of war has on all new concepts, and the lack of theoretical concept or connection in the manuals. The Army system has the final approval of a new concept or doctrine being an individual. Whether this approval is of the initial concept development or the final approval on a

⁶¹Reynolds, 133.

new manual, it is given to an individual. This places a heavy burden on a proposals persuasion, either by the proposer or of its evidence, to convince an individual to allow it to go forward or to become accepted doctrine. The concept runs the risk of never being accepted if the individual strictly adheres to the second weakness of the system--the strong deference to classical theories of war.

Although Clausewitz and Sun Tzu have made a profound impact on the understanding of the theory and practice of war, their theories are becoming dated in practical application and are limited in scope to predominantly state-on-state military operations. Most of the conflicts since 1945 have not been in the Clausewitzian model of state on state, but have been conflicts within a state.⁶² This calls into question the relevancy of Clausewitz's theories relating to much of what the Army faces in today's operational environment. These have and continue to be outside or in the transition between war and peace--the part the Army calls conflict. To penalize a concept because its scope or suggestion falls outside or contrary to these principles runs the risk of discounting potential solutions for the dynamic and changing operational environment the Army faces now and in the future.

The final weakness is the obvious absence of current theory and its correlation to the principles contained, especially in the capstone manuals, *FM 1* and *FM 3-0*. This absence of theory limits the practitioner's ability to read further into current and classic theory on the fundamental principles that describe the art and science of war. This absence and the lack of guidance from the manuals on the importance of studying theory (especially in *FM 6-22*) undercut the essential skill. A skill the Carl von Clausewitz strongly professed as an essential element of understanding war.⁶³ Some newer manuals, like *FM 3-24*, show a marked improvement in the inclusion and use of current theory and scholarly literature to support its

⁶²Mail, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 69-70.

⁶³Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141. "Theory then becomes a guide to any one who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls."

fundamental principles. However, without its inclusion in capstone or leadership doctrine, theory will continue to be absent from the Army's professional process.

In the comparison of the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution and the Army and how they handle theory, it is obvious that the former does a better job. Theory forms the core of both the process used to pursue new knowledge in the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution as well as forming the basis of how practitioners approach the problems. Therefore, using Reynolds' comparison criteria of phenomenon understanding, the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict resolution are clearly the better source on this topic.

CHAPTER 3

CONFLICT

Conflict is and always has been a main focus of the Army. Today's doctrine, principles, and mission statements all focus on the Army's responsibility as the premier land power to win the nation's wars. War, by most definitions, is armed conflict. However, conflict can exist as a status or a manifestation of a condition between two people or groups or, on the other extreme, it can be armed conflict between nations. The reality of today's current operational environment is that the Army is being called on to deal with conflicts between lower level groups (not national). The purpose of their involvement is often to ensure peace not to win war. To further complicate the matter, peace itself has varied definitions. As this shift occurs the Army needs to fully comprehend what conflict means at all levels--the less violent level.

Preventing, managing and resolving conflict in a variety of ways are all part of the Army's day to day operations both within the organization itself and around the world. In order for the Army to deal with conflict most effectively, it must first define conflict in a meaningful way. Until conflict is properly defined and understood, the best solutions will remain illusive. The Army today, while mentioning conflict and conflict resolution in its doctrine, does not present a complete understanding of conflict. Nor does doctrine address any of the theoretical underpinnings of conflict and conflict resolution which is essential to fully comprehending and using the skills necessary to resolve a conflict in the best manner. In addition, doctrine fails to properly present the when, where, and how of applying conflict resolution to conflict. This concept is essential to successfully integrating conflict resolution principles into field situations. As stated in the previous chapter, conflict is a natural part of the human relationships. As such it is neither good nor bad. However, if managed properly it possesses the potential to create a better society. If it is suppressed or coerced then at best the society stagnates at worst it self destructs.⁶⁴

⁶⁴John W. Burton, *World Society* (London:C. Tinling and Co. Ltd, 1972), 137-138.

Conflict--The Field of Conflict Resolution

Conflict, as discussed in the field of conflict resolution and peace studies, is a very complex concept; however there are some common threads. From theorist to theorist, the definition of conflict and related terms and concepts differ. Some select definitions of terms from across the field of conflict resolution and peace studies and the descriptions of some of the derivative characteristics of these terms must be understood. These definitions and characteristics are distilled into a working framework to highlight their relationships, common characteristics, and the potential complexity of this concept.

The first purpose of a body of knowledge is to provide a typology, a common and agreed understanding of terms and concepts so that they can be used with confidence and effectively convey knowledge. The word, concept or idea of “conflict” covers a wide spectrum of situations. Even social scientists will use words interchangeably that actually have very distinct and different meanings. There are several terms that are often misused when discussing conflict. To better understand where conflict fits in the spectrum of contentious social interaction, these terms must be defined.⁶⁵ To begin the spectrum is the term “competition”. Louis Kreisberg defines parties in competition as striving to attain the same values and goals, but not necessarily from each other. Also, Kreisberg notes that parties in competition do not necessarily have to be aware of the other party or the state of competition.⁶⁶ This is like a sports league where any two teams are competing with each other at any given moment for first place. Both are operating under the same system to attain this goal. They attempt to gain first place by defeating the team they play (which may not be the other team in question), and increase their focus on the other team only when it directly affects their standings. Next on the spectrum is the term “rivalry.” Barash and Webel define it by looking at its Latin root *rivus* (river or stream) referring to “those who use a stream in

⁶⁵I use the term “contentious social interactions” to describe those phenomena in society that involve more than one person and exclude peaceful co-existence without contention or interaction.

⁶⁶Kreisberg, 2.

common.”⁶⁷ In other words, this better describes the relationship between the two teams when they are playing each other directly or have a long term history that raises mere competition to something personal and germane to more than just first place in the league (think the Army-Navy game regardless of the teams standings). The next term is “dispute.” John Burton defines “disputes” as situations that “involve negotiable interests.”⁶⁸ This is the situation when in the big game there is an infraction, or perceived infraction, that results in the slighted team losing the game. The slighted team will appeal to the agreed authority, the referee, to make a decision based on the agreed rules and settle the dispute. What is very important to understand is that these three terms are not conflict, even though some practitioners use them interchangeably with “conflict.”

The transition between situations that are not conflict (competition, rivalry, or dispute) and true conflict is described below during the discussion of “cognition” and “structure.” However, the term “latent conflict”, associated with this transition, should be defined here. Kriesberg labels a situation as a “latent conflict” when the participants do not regard themselves in conflict (cognition), do not regard their values in conflict or are not aware of conflicting values (structure).⁶⁹ These situations have the potential of becoming conflict if and when the participants perceive their differences. Once the lines of cognition and structure have been crossed, then a situation can be considered conflict.

Conflict is, as Dennis Sandole describes it, “a dynamic phenomenon.” This description highlights two key aspects of the term “conflict”: first, that it is a phenomenon; and second, that it is dynamic. Sandole goes on to define the phenomenon of “conflict” as “a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one another.”⁷⁰

⁶⁷David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2002), 25-26.

⁶⁸John W. Burton, “Conflict resolution as a political philosophy,” In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 55.

⁶⁹Kriesberg, 2-3.

⁷⁰Dennis J.D. Sandole, “Paradigms, theories, and metaphors,” In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 6.

Kriesburg defines this phenomenon as a situation between individuals or groups who “manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives.”⁷¹ And finally, Burton describes “conflict” as situations concerned with “issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised.”⁷² Therefore, conflict is a phenomenon that is very significant to humans because it is dealing with cognitive structures that define who we are--our values, beliefs, and world views. Conflict defined this way informs the observer of the gravity of the situation. Unlike a dispute, the participants in a conflict have “mutually incompatible goals,” “incompatible objectives” or issues that are “not negotiable.” They consider the other person’s values, ideology, or world view to be incompatible with theirs and therefore invalid and in some cases threatening. This is the case with Salafi-Jihadist and the West. The Jihadists have a list of issues that they espouse as wanting to rectify--infidels in Islam’s holy places, the decadent influence of the West, and the “crusade” that is being waged against them. However, the root of the conflict is not these issues--we could leave the Middle East, stop exporting Starbucks, and make nice with all Muslims and the conflict would still exist--it is the fundamentally different world views that the two groups hold. It is this fact of an individual’s world view and beliefs being the root of conflict (versus a dispute) that makes it so difficult to deal with.

A final note on the definition of conflict, Sandole describes it as a “dynamic phenomenon” because it has different phases that it moves through. These phases are: initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination or resolution.⁷³ Kriesberg also describes conflict in a similar manner in his “conflict cycle”, as seen in figure 1. This is significant in that it helps the observer, and participants, to understand that the same conflict can manifest different characteristics and require different techniques depending on where it is in the process. This can be very helpful, especially when considered with some of the characteristics of a conflict that are discussed next.

⁷¹Burton, “Political Philosophy,” 55.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Sandole, 6.

It is important to go beyond simple definitions of conflict and to examine some of the characteristics found at all levels--individual to international. By studying these commonalities one gains an understanding of conflict and how to identify what type of conflict is being dealt with. The characteristics this chapter will consider are intensity (violence), structure (values), cognition (awareness and perspective), and scope.

The first characteristic is that of intensity which describes when a conflict crosses from being non-violent to violent. This transition is significant to the Army because a conflict that has made this transition is seen by world governments as having a greater need for military involvement. This characteristic is comprised of two opposite distinctions: non-violent and violent. Each of these distinctions consists of two parts: non-violent consists of positive peace and negative peace; and violent conflict consists of open hostilities and warfare. The difference between positive peace and negative peace is significant. Negative peace describes a situation in which significant overt, physical violence or warfare is absent. This is the how peace has been traditionally defined and recognized by most government agencies, including the Army. Positive peace describes a circumstance in which both the issue of physical violence and structural violence are eliminated or minimized. The idea of positive peace, developed by Johan Galtung, in conjunction with structural violence, is more than just the absence of significant physical violence or warfare. Positive peace describes a situation that has addressed both the traditional absence of violence and the absence structural violence. The structural violence describes when a society or

culture establishes or allows practices, laws, or norms that deny fundamental rights to members of its group. Such rights as: access to education; economic well-being; social, political, and sexual equality; a sense of personal fulfillment and self-worth.⁷⁴ Structural violence creates a segment of that society, when they become cognitive of this situation, that realizes that they are being forced to live under a different set of rules and have their self-image compromised by the society they are living in. This becomes a major source of conflict. The issue of slavery throughout history is an excellent example: arguably, the United States experienced almost 73 years of negative peace from the 1776 to 1861. However, there were two segments of its society, African slaves and Native Americans, who were experiencing structural violence that prevented positive peace from occurring. This absence of positive peace led to several slave uprisings, Indian wars, and contributed to the American Civil War.

Just as important as this distinction between positive and negative peace is the distinction between non-violent and violent conflict. Sandole notes a distinctive difference in definitions for conflict when it crosses this line. The participants go from just trying to undermine each other's goal-seeking capabilities to physically or psychologically damaging or destroying property or high-value objects of the other and eventually trying to forcibly eliminate the other.⁷⁵ Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, in their *Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, stated that the violence in a conflict is a problem itself.⁷⁶ In other words, regardless of the nature of the incompatible goals or values that are at the heart of any conflict, once it becomes violent (either physically or psychologically) it takes on a new nature and begins to generate additional issues and create new interests that must be resolved in addition to the original clash of values. It adds a new layer that by its destructive and often permanent nature must be addressed.

⁷⁴David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2002), 6-7.

⁷⁵Sandole, 6-7.

⁷⁶Mitchell and Banks, 2-3.

A second defining characteristic of conflict is the value systems of the two individuals or groups. If the goals or values of the parties are identical or nearly identical then the issue is merely a matter of how to accomplish that goal (competition or rivalry) or uphold those values if one or both parties violate or are perceived as violating them (dispute). It can be solved through negotiation or a court system where an authority makes a ruling and the parties abide by it or appeal based on the rule of law or established norms and procedures. This is not a true conflict. Conflict is a values disagreement. The two groups are not operating in an arena where they both agree on right, correct or proper. Therefore if an outside party makes a judgment there is no agreement upon what basis that judgment is to be made. It is critical to understand this aspect of conflict in our current world environment as well as within the Army organization itself.

A third characteristic is cognition. It is divided into two categories: awareness and perception. Parties involved in rivalries, competitions, disputes may or may not be aware of the values or system which they are operating under. However, this awareness is not essential since they are using the same set of values. In the case of latent conflicts, both participants are not aware or do not manifest an awareness that their values are in opposition to the values of the other party. Kriesberg notes that outside observers cannot define a phenomenon between two individuals or groups as a conflict when neither of the parties believes they are in conflict. Social, political or cultural norms may have created an environment where these parties do not feel they are in conflict because the situation has always been this way. While this may be latent conflict, neither side feels the need to label the situation as such. When one or both parties do become aware and begin to manifest this awareness (for example, in protest, actively becoming a part of the political system, rebellion) the phenomena has changed from latent to true conflict. The second part of cognition is perception, whether or not the parties involved perceive the situation as being a positive or negative event. Any situation along the spectrum of social interaction can be viewed either in a positive or negative light. Mitchell and Banks made this distinction because it dramatically alters the way observers and participants should consider conflict, especially

prolonged deep-rooted, violent conflict. They argue that by avoiding a negative or fatalistic view of conflict--conflict is inevitable, the violent conflict has made the parties intractable, coercion and force are the only options--an observer or third-party observer can consider other options and, more importantly, help the participants see beyond the immediate issues to new, lasting resolution.⁷⁷

The final characteristic is scope. The characteristic of scope captures the size of the conflict from two people to global conflict. This is a good measure of how to approach a conflict. It lends itself to suggesting possible solutions, and is a technique for organizing the information concerning conflict and conflict resolution theory. This is based off of John Waltz's framework which he introduced in his book *The Man, the State, and War* (1959). In it he identifies three levels or images to consider conflict: "(1) The Individual Level (image I); (2) The Societal/National Level (image II); and (3) The Trans-Societal/International Level (Image III)."⁷⁸ (4) The Global Level (image IV) has been added by Robert North (1990) and Nazli Choucri (Choucri and North, 1990)."⁷⁹ This characteristic is depicted in a vertical manner on the chart and shows that the other qualities, running horizontal, exist at each of the four levels. The Individual Level captures the studies and practices of those who deal with interpersonal conflicts. Sandole divided this level into four subcategories. The first category is biological which captures those theorists and practitioners who postulate that conflict is a result of human nature--it's in our genes. The second category is physiological. Those who practice in this area study conflict as a 'symptom' of the human nature--our brains are hard-wired this way. Learning is the third category which represents those thinkers who see conflict as a product of nurturing--boys are

⁷⁷Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2.

⁷⁸John Waltz, *The Man, the State, and War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), quoted in Dennis J.D. Sandole, "Paradigms, theories, and metaphors," In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 7.

⁷⁹N. Choucri and R.C. North, 'Global environmental change: Toward a framework for decision and policy,' Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA) (Washington, D.C., 10-14 April); and R.C. North, *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis*, (Boulder, Colorado: West Press 1990), 25, quoted in Dennis J.D. Sandole, "Paradigms, theories, and metaphors," In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 7.

aggressive because they are taught to be that way. Finally, category four is dissonance. The theorists and practitioners in this category explain that conflict and violence stem from a cognitive reaction to a perceived disconnect between preferred and actual states of affair--this is describing disappointed expectations of the most basic human rights and needs (John Galtung's structural violence fits into this category).⁸⁰ A key point about the lessons learned at the individual level is they can be applied at the societal (level II) and beyond--"*individuals* are still involved across the spectrum of different levels of analysis, as *decision-makers*."⁸¹ Mitchell and Banks reinforced this idea with their observation "that the shared features of conflict, at all levels of human society, seemed more significant than the differences."⁸² John Burton supported this as well by observing that events in Eastern Europe following the fall of the Iron Curtain compel academia to move "from institutions to persons as the units of analysis" in the area of international and intranational conflict.⁸³

Those studying the Societal Level focus on how large groups and governments deal with conflict and violence within the confines of a state and how these internal systems generate domestic pressure that spill into the international scene. Many of the characteristics and practices developed at the individual level are modified, tested, and utilized to explain and resolve conflict at this level.⁸⁴ The International Level tends toward anarchy from a nation-state perspective. There is nothing of significance outside the nation-state that can enforce decisions or prevent another nation-state from going to war; ergo nation-states operate in a system, or systems, that lack enforcement or coherency. This is why theorists at this level examine closely the efficacy of mono-polar, bipolar or multi-polar circumstances have on how the international system works.⁸⁵ Again, the concepts and theories developed at the individual (and societal level) still bear on the equation, because individuals (and groups) still make decisions about what nations will or will

⁸⁰C Sandole, 7-14.

⁸¹Ibid., 14-15.

⁸²Mitchell and Banks, vii.

⁸³John Burton, "Political Philosophy," 59.

⁸⁴Sandole, 14-17.

⁸⁵Ibid., 17-19.

not do. Finally, the Global Level, as introduced by Robert North defines and focuses on the “natural and societal environment and allows for the systematic investigation of the ways they interact on land, in the sea, and in space and for the outcomes.” This closely studies how the first three levels impact and interact with the global level, in particular the global environment, and how it contributes to conflict and violence.⁸⁶

Conflict--The Army

The Army uses the phrase, “peace, conflict, and war” to describe its operational environment and in conjunction with its spectrum of operations.⁸⁷ Army doctrine clearly defines and prioritizes the Army’s roles by stating, “The Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces to fight and win the nation’s wars and achieve directed national objectives”⁸⁸ It also clearly defines in its doctrine its role in Peace Operations (PO), “Army forces conduct PO to support strategic and policy objectives and their implementing diplomatic activities.”⁸⁹ The term conflict is used to describe those operations and hostile events that exist between peace and war. The Army’s describes conflict and peace in terms of levels of hostility, the scope of involvement of others, and as a status between groups or nations. The Army, however, does not specifically define peace or war as it does conflict and does not attempt to define the transition between peace, conflict and war.

The Army defines conflict as “An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an

⁸⁶R.C. North, *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis*, (Boulder, Colorado: West Press 1990), 25, quoted in Dennis J.D. Sandole, “Paradigms, theories, and metaphors,” In *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, ed. Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 19.

⁸⁷Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1-1.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 9-6.

indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force.”⁹⁰ The Army has a specific definition of conflict, which is supported in its use throughout the capstone manuals. There are a few examples of conflict being used as synonym for dispute or disagreement. The vast majority describe low to mid-intensity combat, insurgency, civil war, and rebellion. From this definition and these examples some general characteristics can be drawn.

Conflict as defined by the Army suggests several key characteristics. First, that it involves physical violence, as implied that it is an armed struggle or clash. Also, conflict can be depicted on a spectrum (see figure 3) with the level of hostility, or violence, being the determining factor between peace, conflict, and war. This arguably makes violence the key characteristic. Second, that it is at a minimum a social phenomenon, versus individual, because it ranges from groups to the international level. Third, its scope is limited and confined to either political or military objectives. Fourth, it is often protracted, implying a deep-rooted and multi-generational source that increases the complexity of finding a resolution. The Army states that the desired end state for conflict is to defeat the enemy, attain the nation’s goals for the conflict, and set conditions for a sustainable post-conflict stability.⁹¹ Conflict encompasses those events when peace begins to break down and before the nation commits to war. It is a broad term that is used to define most hostile phenomena short of declared war. This makes conflict a versatile and important term in the Army’s taxonomy, considering it describes almost all the events the Army has been involved with since the end of World War II. The term conflict is used with the actions taken in Korea, Vietnam,⁹² Desert Shield and Desert Storm,⁹³ and the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹⁴ These events are each described as and meet the Army’s definition of a conflict.

⁹⁰Department of the Army, FM 1-02, 112.

⁹¹Department of the Army, FM3-0, 1-3.

⁹²Department of the Army, FM 1, 1-8.

⁹³Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 3-1.

⁹⁴Department of the Army, FM 1, 1-9.




Figure 3 Army Role in Theater Engagement

Source: Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 9-2.

Although Army doctrine does not specifically define war, some of its characteristics can be implied from the definition of conflict, Army principles, missions, and the chart “Army Role in Theater Engagement” from FM 3-0. War is at the highest end of the hostility or violence spectrum, it is waged between groups or nations, and is fought for political and military objectives--consistent with Clausewitz, “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political

instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”⁹⁵ It is central to what the Army is, prepares to do and does. This can be seen in the central part war plays in the Army’s Role. The Army’s role is fighting and winning the nation’s wars, and when possible, deterring war.⁹⁶ The Army is expected to provide the combatant commander with the preeminent landpower, versatile and capable winning the nation’s wars.⁹⁷ The Army’s end state for war is the collapse of the enemy’s will to allow the United States to exert its will⁹⁸--also in keeping with Clausewitz, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”⁹⁹ Therefore, war is the considered the most violent endeavor, it has a clearly defined endstate, and one of the most dominant concepts in the Army’s taxonomy.

Similarly, peace is not explicitly defined. Drawing from the same sources, a definition can be fashioned. Peace describes a social setting (local, national or international) in which there is an absence or low level of hostility (lower than conflict). It implies no political or military objectives are unmet, or those objects that are unmet are not being acted on through hostile military means. In this circumstance, the Army moves from being the supported element of national power to a more supporting role, with diplomatic (political) taking the lead. In Peace Operations, the Army supports “diplomatic efforts to secure a long-term political settlement.”¹⁰⁰ The Army’s desired end state for peace is to train for war, help shape the international security environment, help civil authorities, both nationally and internationally, and prepare to respond to natural or manmade disasters.¹⁰¹ Peace is essentially a time when the Army prepares for war, there is an absence of significant violence, and the Army is able to focus its efforts on military operations other than war. From this description, it can be inferred that the Army uses the “negative peace” construct to identify peaceful phenomenon.

⁹⁵Clausewitz, 87.

⁹⁶Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1-3.

⁹⁷Department of the Army, FM 1, 1-1.

⁹⁸Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1-3.

⁹⁹Clausewitz, 75.

¹⁰⁰Department of the Army, FM 3-07.31, *Peace Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 1-1.

¹⁰¹Department of the Army, FM 3-0, 1-3.

Conflict--Conclusion

Conflict is the central concept to the operational environments for the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution and the Army. The changes brought about by the end of the Cold War have caused these professions to take a hard look at this concept and how it is defined. These definitions are critical. Kriesberg argues that how a group perceives a situation or concept goes a long way in explaining and predicting what method and means they will use to resolve it.¹⁰² The Army is in the business of dealing with and deterring conflict.¹⁰³ The Army re-focused from the traditional challenge of war and high-intensity conflict to a more balanced view of these four challenges: irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and traditional (see figure 4). This refocus is evidenced in the Army's Posture Statement, its transformation, and the recent updates in the Stability Operations (FM 3-07, 2003), Peace Operations (FM 3-07.31, 2003) and Counterinsurgency manuals (FM 3-24, 2006). The fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution responded to the shift with its own reexamination of defining conflict. A major shift was the focus away from international institutions being the unit of analysis to the individual. This shift was accompanied with the redefining of the key concept of conflict. This resulted in a more detailed and deeper understanding of the concept. A similar step needs to be taken within the Army.

¹⁰²Kriesberg, 30-31.

¹⁰³Department of the Army, FM 1, 2-5.




Figure 4 The Security Environment

Source: Department of the Army, "Army Posture Statement 2006", (Washington, DC: Government Printing office, 2006)

The Army's definition of conflict continues to be very narrow, relating primarily to violent conflict between groups. Just as it has expanded its understanding and scope of its operational environment, it must also expand its understanding of conflict, a key concept within this operational environment. Without this expansion in definition, and arguably understanding, the Army's ability to deal with this problem will lag behind the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. The Army may fail to recognize conflict at individual level. This requires more training and understanding of individual conflict. One way to accomplish this goal is to not

only focus on group non-violent conflict but also individual conflict. Conflict within an organization can be a starting point for training and practicing the skill sets necessary for identifying, dealing with and resolving conflict.

As noted by Reynolds concerning the comparison of theories, it is better to choose a theory that describes the process in better causal detail than a simple theory. The fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution demonstrate a better understanding of the concept and the causal relationships that produce much of the conflict in the world. Therefore, the conclusion of the comparison would be for the theories of the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict resolution, as with conflict, is manifest from the individual to the international level. Conflict resolution researchers state that the similarities at the individual level to the national far outweigh the differences. This is not an attempt of reductionism, but the observation that the causes of conflict and the methods of conflict resolution at the individual level have applicability at the higher levels because individuals still make the decisions at the national level.¹⁰⁴ The complexity as the conflict expands in scope is a product of the increase in the number of individual decisions and the increasing affect of social, cultural, political, and economic dynamics. This exponential growth of decision makers and decisive factors create the more complex environment and give purpose to the need to better understand the application of conflict resolution at lower levels.

The field of conflict resolution and peace studies was founded and has focused on the central aim of preventing violent conflict since its inception in the 1950s.¹⁰⁵ As a field of social science, it uses the analytical skills essential to the academic profession to explain how war and violent conflict happens in order to develop methods to prevent it. The study and practice of conflict resolution starts with an understanding of what causes war or conflict. This understanding gives rise to methods that can be tested and validated, in both general and specific applications. This analytical consideration of a particular conflict coupled with general methods and practices allows the practitioner to apply specific methods to a specific conflict. Another important consideration when deciding on how to resolve a conflict is identifying the expected endstate. For conflict resolution practitioners and theorists, the end state is to prevent or end conflict (both direct and structural) and in the process gain a better understanding of causal relationships between conflict, its causes, and its preventors.

¹⁰⁴Sandole, 14-15.

¹⁰⁵Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 93.

The Army's desired end state for conflict resolution through negotiation is "a way to advance US interests by jointly decided action."¹⁰⁶ Conflict resolution as an Army skill is as all skills purposed to mission accomplishment--detering and winning the nations wars and meeting the political objectives. It is a relatively new skill to Army doctrine. Current Army doctrine provides rudimentary principles in conflict resolution. It does not provide concrete examination of the causes of conflict or war or any clear correlation as to how this should influence the choice of methodology. The Army focuses this skill at addressing external issues and supporting political efforts in Peace Operations.

Conflict Resolution--The Field of Conflict Resolution

The field of conflict resolution is comprised of a large variety of methods and characterizations to describe how to deal with a conflict. Some general terms of the field are: conflict settlement, conflict management, and conflict resolution. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse describe conflict settlement as when an agreement to cease violence and hostilities has been reached. However the root causes of the conflict have not been resolved. Conflict management covers the gamut of positive conflict handling. More specifically it is a circumstance where violence is limited, mitigated or contained. Conflict resolution implies the deep-rooted sources of conflict are resolved. It exists when violence is gone, attitudes are changed, and the structure of the conflict has changed. Multi-track conflict resolution describes the relationship between official (Track One) and unofficial participants (Track Two) to conflict resolution¹⁰⁷

As a member of a conflict resolution team, it is important to understand the relationship between parties and the conflict. A simple way to describe these relationships is: directly involved--a primary or tertiary participant; intermediary--external to the problem, but working closely with all parties; this also includes third party intervention--either using hard power, peace

¹⁰⁶Department of the Army, FM3-07.31, VII-3.

¹⁰⁷Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 20.

enforcement, or soft power, persuasion. Mitchell and Banks noted that the drawback to hard power is it undermines the trust in your neutrality of at least one party, sometimes both.¹⁰⁸

Techniques to address conflict and disputes are mediation, in which parties enter into discussions voluntarily with a third party and maintain control of the process and outcome.¹⁰⁹ Next is arbitration, when parties submit control over the outcome to a third party to make a legally binding decision.¹¹⁰ Negotiation is when two parties, with or without the help of a third party, enter into discussion to “create something new that neither party could do on his or her own, or . . . to resolve a problem or dispute.”¹¹¹ A key characteristic of negotiation, according to *Essentials of Negotiation*, is interdependency. This describes the fact both parties need each other to accomplish their interlocking goals.¹¹² Conflict resolution is attainable once the parties have reached a position where they are either physically dependent and/or cognitively dependent on each other. In the process of de-escalation, bringing a conflict, especially a violent conflict, back to the level where the parties realize they need each other to settle the conflict is crucial. The book also points out that “theory and research from economics, psychology, political science, communication, labor relations, law, sociology, anthropology”¹¹³ provide a wide range of perspectives to better understand negotiations.

Collaborative analytical, problem-solving process (CAPS) is a non-directive, third party, Track-Two method that is specifically aimed at protracted, deep rooted violent conflict.¹¹⁴ Through access, preparation, workshops, and repeating this process, practitioners work with the participants of conflict. The CAPS is optimized for conflicts arising from parties dealing with salient and, ostensibly, non-negotiable values, and exemplified by such conflicts as those in

¹⁰⁸Mitchell and Banks, 3.

¹⁰⁹Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, 21.

¹¹⁰Ken Sande, *The Peacemaker*. 2nd Ed (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 247.

¹¹¹Roy J. Liewicki, David M. Saunders, Bruce Barry, and John W. Minton, *Essentials of Negotiations*, (Boston: McGraw Hill and Irwin, 2004), 3.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 6.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 3.

¹¹⁴Mitchell and Banks, xiv.

Northern Ireland or between Israelis and Palestinians, or Armenians and Azeris.¹¹⁵ Collaborative analytical, problem-solving process starts with a general set of theoretical assumptions concerning society and a particular set concerning conflict linked to a set of procedures for intervening in conflict situations.¹¹⁶ The first and most crucial step of CAPS after gaining access to a conflict is preparation. Mitchell and Banks recommend that if an unbiased theoretician cannot be brought in to conduct the initial analysis, then practitioners must avoid biasing their process with their own pre-conceived notions.¹¹⁷ It is important to avoid injecting unnecessary concepts and biases into the process. In the case of protracted, deep-rooted conflict, the participants are preeminent. They created the problem, and they are the ones who need to develop the solutions to resolving the process.¹¹⁸ Practitioners of CAPS need to be prepared to assist the participants in analyzing their own paradigms and personal theories in order to deconstruct them and enable the participants to clearly understand the problem. This can only be done by someone who has a firm grasp on the theoretical and analytical process. This process, ideally, enables the practitioner to guide the participants in focusing away from seeking to eliminate the opposition and towards why they need the other party to accomplish their goals.¹¹⁹ Out of these workshops and sessions emerge viable alternative solutions that are acceptable to the leadership of the parties when they engage in Track One negotiations. It lays the groundwork for more formal settlements, but they are settlements and agreements more willingly accepted because the underlying interests have been addressed. The modified attitudes toward these interests allow the participants to move forward.

The CAPS process enables third party workers to establish a working relationship with the essential, not necessarily the highest level, leaders of the parties. Through these lower level leaders, the focus is always on the participants, new and acceptable options are worked and

¹¹⁵Ibid., xviii.

¹¹⁶Ibid., xvii.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 32-33.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 5.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 5.

considered. It is a time intensive process and could require months to accomplish just a few meetings and the establishment of what parties and which participants will attend the working sessions. It is based on a theoretical and analytical problem solving method that attempts to look at each conflict as a unique event, especially during the information gathering phase. The assessment this provides is as unbiased as possible and should provide the essential personnel and issues that need to be addressed in the negotiations.

Conflict Resolution--The Army

In response to the changing environment, the Army has recognized the role negotiations and conflict resolution play in the current operational environment. This inclusion is so recent, that neither concept appears in the Army's capstone manuals. The Army's conflict resolution is characterized by three key aspects: (1) it is focused external to the organization; (2) the Army primary role is support to political efforts, but expects tactical leaders to conduct limited operations; and (3) the primary skill is negotiation. These three aspects are found in: FM 3-07 and FM 3-07.31, both published in 2003; and Field Manual 6-22 (FM 6-22), *Army Leadership*, published in 2006.

Field Manual 6-22 identifies conflict resolution as being a competency subset of extending influence beyond the chain of command.¹²⁰ It describes it as a process that identifies and analyzes the differences and similarities of disputing parties. Conflict resolution then re-interprets the differences to foster negotiating a new and agreed set of goals.¹²¹ It identifies that the leader uses this process to extend influence beyond the chain of command to external groups.¹²² However, there are no indications it is considered as a means of influencing within the chain of command. Even though the Army teaches that we operate on the same values, "Army Values", this is changing along with the current operational environment. Army leaders need to

12. ¹²⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 7-

¹²¹*Ibid.*, 7-12 through 7-13.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 11-2.

understand how to lead people with different values. As referred to in Chapter One, the Wong analysis of the officer survey highlighted the shift in values between the generations within the Army. This is reinforced by the findings in the recent Army mental health survey indicated that a sizeable portion of those service members in Iraq would condone torture to protect United States service members' lives--a violation of Army values.¹²³ As the Army faces these and other changes, it will find more and more opportunities to apply conflict resolution within its own ranks.

Field Manual 3-07.31 clearly explains that negotiations are a central technique to conflict resolution and that Soldiers should not expect to ever be conducting a major negotiation. These types of operations fall to the Department of State. However, military personnel should be prepared to support, and if necessary, to participate in the negotiations.¹²⁴ This relationship between military and political agents is keeping with the overall guidance given concerning Peace Operations. Peace Operations are characterized by a heavy influence of political presence, all the way down to the tactical level. These operations tend to involve multiple nations and are usually conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.¹²⁵ This, as with negotiations, interjects the political aspect and the Army recognizes its need to be subordinate to this process.

As stated above, negotiations are seen as a central technique in conflict resolution. The Army provides several pages of explanation and characteristics in FM 6-22, FM 3-07 and FM 3-07.31.¹²⁶ However, there are some key characteristics contained in these two manuals that seem to contradict each other. FM3-07.31 explains that once a Soldier becomes a member of the negotiation team, the military has now been interjected into the problem and loses its appearance

¹²³Jomana Karadsheh and Barbara Starr, "Study: Anxiety, depression, acute stress in combat troops," Available from <http://www.cnn.com/>; Internet: accessed on 17 May 2007.

¹²⁴Department of the Army, FM 3-07.31, E-0.

¹²⁵Ibid., I-1 through I-2.

¹²⁶In FM 6-22 several paragraphs in multiple chapters are used to describe and explain negotiations and conflict resolution; FM3-07 has an entire appendix (Appendix E) to cover just negotiations; and FM 3-07.31 has an entire chapter (Chapter VII) to cover Conflict Resolution, with a large portion devoted to negotiations.

of neutrality.¹²⁷ Negotiations are an exercise in persuasion and a way for the Army to advance the interests of the United States “by jointly decided decisions.”¹²⁸ FM 3-07 explains that since negotiations are an exercise in persuasion, negotiators “must consider them [other parties in the negotiation] as partners in solving the problem.”¹²⁹ Yet no mention is made of the importance or affect of the other parties’ interests in light of advancing those of the United States. FM 6-22 states that trust and understanding are determining factors in negotiations and conflict resolution.¹³⁰ The result of these three manuals is some confusion at what is the true intent of a Soldier engaging in negotiations as a part of conflict resolution. Is the main purpose to simply advance United States interests (a core principle) or to build teamwork based on trust with an external entity. These are mutually exclusive goals and lead to confusion when trying to apply these techniques. This confusion is probably a product of the immature development of this topic within Army doctrine.

Conflict Resolution--Conclusion

As an organization faces change, it must change with it or perish. The Army is committed to being a learning and adaptive organization.¹³¹ The incorporation of conflict resolution and negotiation into Army doctrine is an indicator of this commitment. However, the Army’s concept of conflict resolution as found in Army doctrine appears very underdeveloped when it is compared with the theory and methodologies of the field of Conflict Resolution. As stated in the last chapter, this lack of development may have contributed to the contradiction concerning conflict resolution’s underlying purpose found in the manuals. This contradiction could lead to confusion that could lead to failed negotiations and a loss of confidence in the skill or worse.

¹²⁷Ibid., I-1 through VII-1.

¹²⁸Ibid., I-1 through VII-3.

¹²⁹Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), E-1.

¹³⁰Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 7-13.

¹³¹Department of the Army, *Army Posture Statement 2006*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 12.

The field of Conflict Resolution clearly explains the concept of conflict resolution. It also describes related concepts that resemble conflict resolution but are not--conflict settlement and conflict management. These are useful terms because they describe situations where the endstate may be more in line with what the Army needs to accomplish in a particular situation or at that time. If full conflict resolution is not attainable (for example, settling the violence not the conflict is the Army's goal) then the Army would have a concise term and a principle to guide its decisions and actions. Instead of having negotiation where both side's goals need to come together as in conflict resolution, the Army leader could pursue a negotiation more focused on the United States' interests--say ending the violence.

Both Army manuals and the field of Conflict Resolution do a great job of defining aspects of mediation, arbitration and negotiation. However, as is seen in the brief examination of the collaborative analytical, problem-solving (CAPS) process, to attain lasting resolution in deep-rooted, protracted violent conflict is a complex and time consuming process. These are the type of conflicts the Army is often called in to help settle. Army manuals appear to have accurately described how the Army should expect to fit into this process as a secondary role supporting the organizations conducting the actual conflict resolution. It is important, as the manuals state, for Army leaders to continue to learn these skills because often the organizations that will conduct the conflict resolution will not be the Department of State but non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This fuller understanding of conflict resolution will allow the Army to cooperate better with these agencies, and ensure Army actions will compliment and not contradict the actions the NGOs are taking to resolve the conflict.

As with the concept of conflict, the field of Conflict Resolution has a much better defined and in depth understanding of the concept of conflict resolution than the Army. It defines key terms and the different levels and circumstances to promote understanding and to enhance explanatory and predictive capabilities. The Army is just venturing into this field. The manuals show a great start, but they need more work. As stated earlier in the chapter, without a deeper and

broad understanding of what conflict is, the Army is going to continue to have a limited view of what conflict resolution is and where it applies. Therefore, the theories and practices of the field of Conflict Resolution provide better understanding of these phenomena.

CONCLUSION--RECOMMENDED CHANGES

The Nation and the Army are facing dramatic changes in the world today. These changes and the events that have precipitated these changes are creating the external pressure that drives an organization to either change or perish. However, the consequences of the Army failing are not acceptable. The Army is taking steps to change with the new operational environment. These steps are evidenced by the transformation process the Army is pursuing and the new manuals it is publishing. However, this monograph presented three fundamental areas--theory, conflict, conflict resolution--that the Army needs to make further changes to ensure its adaptability and capability in this new environment.

Chapter Two presented the fundamental purposes for theories. These are to clearly define terms, promote the understanding of phenomena, and, as Clausewitz stated, train the judgment of the practitioner.¹³² Towards this end, the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution clearly practice and promote this use and definition of theory. The Army has recently incorporated the scientific methods of theoreticians into formal doctrine process, but the manuals, especially capstone manuals, pay little note to theory or its purpose in the development of knowledge. Also noted were some of the fundamental flaws in the formal process that could prevent the incorporation of new ideas into doctrine. The comparison concluded that the Army is still lacking in the application of theory.

Chapter Three considered how the two disciplines addressed the key element of conflict. The fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution promoted a thorough definition of conflict. This definition covers both violent and non-violent situations and the scope of individual to

¹³²Clausewitz, 141.

international incidents. The Army's is much narrower. It limits itself to armed conflict only and relegates conflict to being an external issue to the Army and a matter of group dynamics. Again, this narrow definition limits the Army's ability to use, understand, and train concerning conflict. The comparison concluded that the Army's theories and definitions were lacking.

Chapter Four took the next step from conflict to address conflict resolution. Here the documents considered showed that the Army is making progress in the area of conflict resolution. However, when compared to that of the field of Conflict Resolution, the shortcomings become apparent. The most obvious is the contradiction present between the three manuals considered on the fundamental issue of purpose. This contradiction, coupled with the lack of breadth in the concept of conflict resolution itself, leaves the Army's current theoretical and doctrinal stance very weak in comparison to that of the field of Conflict Resolution. Again, the comparison concluded that the field of Conflict Resolution is far superior in explaining conflict resolution and its practices. From these three comparisons, the following recommendations are proposed.

Recommendations

First, the Army must incorporate and teach more about theory. Army doctrine, the source of all Army training, is surprisingly silent on the role theory plays in the development of Army practice and principles. With the exceptions of the new FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* and FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* there are few if any references to the theoretical underpinnings to the principles, practices, and techniques put forth in Army manuals; when these theorists are cited, there are no footnotes or endnotes that clearly tie statements in doctrine with their corresponding theory. This makes it difficult for a practitioner to understand the connection between a theory and its corresponding practice. As the Army revives FM 1, *The Army* it should include a section on theory, as it has on history.

Second, the Army must reevaluate and expand its definition of conflict. The current definition is too narrow and associates conflict primarily with hostile or violent actions. This

definition precludes conflicts that have not reached the violent stage. This distinction is critical because conflict is much easier to resolve prior to it crossing the line between non-violent and violent. It also precludes the inclusion of individual conflict issues in consideration for the application of conflict resolution skills. As noted in Chapter One, there exists a conflict of values in the Army today. The Army is missing an excellent training opportunity of honing conflict resolution skills by not including these individual, internal issues as requiring this attention. The Army should update the definitions found in FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* and FM 3-0 to reflect the broader and more inclusive definitions found in the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.

Finally, the Army must develop a separate manual for conflict resolution. The Army must expand its coverage of conflict resolution as it further develops its understanding of conflict, at all levels. Based on the research into the field of Conflict Resolution, to properly cover the principles and potential methods available, the Army will need an entire manual. The complexity of the situations the Army faces today requires a more detailed examination of this topic than is currently provided. The incorporation of this topic into one manual should also eliminate the contradictory information that is currently found in the manuals. This recommendation would have the proponent for conflict be FM 3-0 and the proponent for conflict resolution fall under FM 6-22 as a leadership skill.

This monograph compared and contrasted how the fields of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution and the Army defined and perceived theory, conflict and conflict resolution. Through this comparison, a clearer understanding of all three topics has been developed. This understanding has led to the recommendations for the Army to continue to further develop these key concepts within its doctrine. In the current operational environment, change is happening faster and in more areas than ever before in history. It is incumbent upon the Army, or any organization, to ensure that it prepares its members to deal with this new reality. The agile thinker, a concept the Army embraces, is fundamental to this preparation. The training of theory

and a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of conflict and how to resolve it will contribute significantly to the agile minds of current and future Army leaders.

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APPENDIX A--Three Forms of Theory

In Chapter 5 of Paul Reynolds's book, *A Primer in Theory Construction*, he describes the forms of theories by taking one set of statements developed by Terrence K. Hopkins (from his book, *The Exercise of Influence In Small Groups*. Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster Press, 1964) and presenting them in each form:

Set-of-Laws Form

Source: Paul Davidson Reynolds, *A Primer in Theory Construction*, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 84-90.